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I. THE VALUE OF COMPARISONS
A sustainable peace in the Middle East will require a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees. Indeed, this is why so much has been written about this issue in the context of peace negotiations.' But this Essay takes a different approach, offering comparative historical perspectives on the organization, procedures, and criteria for implementing the right of return and compensation for lost property. It is a technical and not a political treatment.
The objective of this Essay is to add new information and analytical insights to the debate, namely, research about how refugee and compensation solutions have been implemented in other situations. Practical implementation options are examined from a.variety of comparative experiences. Examining these options could help soften the political absolutism that characterizes the current impasse on the refugee issue. But there is value in any event in understanding the international system context, and mapping realistic scenarios for such matters as an institutional framework to implement a settlement, the criteria and procedures for relocating refugees, and techniques and methods to award adequate compensation. It is, in effect, a tutorial on what has worked in other settings, assuming a settlement of the conflict.
Arrangements relating to Palestinian refugees are in certain ways distinct from generic refugee responses. 2 Research and Indeed, the refugee issue has surfaced periodically as negotiations to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have waxed and waned. Refugees were profiled recently in efforts by former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who convened in July 2000 a summit meeting at Camp David, Maryland, in an audacious bid to resolve the conflict."' The issue emerged centrally in the course of the settlement gambit at Camp David, and follow-on exchanges at Taba in Egypt.' 1 In these settings, they became a deal-blocker, with both sides taking maximalist positions. 12 Israeli negotiators, concerned about the demographic dimension, insisted on alternatives to an absolute right of return." Palestinian negotiators have long insisted on a categorical right of return, arguing that refugees should be given the maximum feasible choice in terms of where to live in the future.' 4 In an attempt to finesse the return issue, a proposal was tabled in these recent discussions for the relocation of refugees to Israeli territory, which would then be transferred to a Palestinian State.' 5 In addition, the United States proposed a financial package, reportedly of U.S.$10 billion, designed to break the impasse and help buttress a peace agreement, while prepared to solicit donations from other countries to compensate Palestinian refugees. Palestinian negotiators have suggested that a figure of scores or even hundreds of billions of dollars would be necessary to constitute fair compensation. 16 Debates about the right of refugees to return to their homes in what is now Israel will permeate political commentary as well 10 [Vol. 28:1325 as settlement negotiations. 7 Yet, the absorption of refugees into Israel will be highly controversial and will likely be severely limited, with Israeli negotiators never having agreed to accept back more than 100,000 individuals annually even when the conflict was fresh."R But the affirmation in principle of the right to return, and the reception of refugees into Israeli territory that is then transferred to Palestinian sovereignty, as well as continued family reunification admissions to Israel, may be feasible. In fact, questions over family reunification have been raised repeatedly in refugee negotiations, even though the issue is analytically distinct, with Israel agreeing in the past to admit 2,000 family reunification cases annually (6000 persons)." Actual practice has been more difficult to discern. 20 In envisioning a resolution of the problem, the nearly 400,000 Palestinian refugees who are registered in Lebanon 2 " have been prioritized in discussions as they are considered among the most needy and likely to be pressured to leave after a settlement. 22 Also, both sides have discussed the establishment of an international commission and fund to deal with compensation issues. 23 Both have suggested that relatively small sums of compensation could be paid on a per capita basis to refugees in fast track procedures. 24 But there is no meeting of the minds relating to the method by which to calculate compensation, nor is there agreement on the amount that would be contributed to an international fund. 25 Both sides have discussed UNRWA being phased-out, with the Palestinian side more favorable than the Israeli side to a continuing role for the agency. 
III. THE EARLY INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS ADMINISTRATION
Historically, the principal international humanitarian response to Palestinian refugees has been UNRWA, which was established in 1949 by the U.N. General Assembly. 27 When the agency began operations in 1951, it sought to address the humanitarian needs of some 900,000 refugees, 268,000 of whom resided in 60 different camps in the region. 28 Because the General Assembly did not define who was a Palestinian refugee, agency officials developed their own registration criteria. 29 Initially, UNRWA policy documents defined a refugee as a person who, as a result of the Palestinian conflict, had lost his home and means of livelihood." 0 Subsequently, this definition was further refined, and UNRWA has come to consider a refugee to be a person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period June 1, 1946, to May 15, 1948, and who, as a result of the Palestinian conflict, had lost both a home and means of livelihood, and the descendants of such a person. 1 In the early years, UNRWA began addressing the immediate needs of Palestinian refugees in terms of shelter, education, food and health services. 32 When the prospect for more enduring arrangements seemed feasible, public works projects and smallscale integration projects were initiated by the agency, 3 sometimes in the face of a highly suspicious refugee clientele who feared the extinguishment of their right to return and the liquidation of their cause through the promotion of assimilation and resettlement schemes. "4 In practice, refugee status was perpetuated for political and economic reasons, and repatriation was considered infeasible. UNRWA.
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The large sums needed for physical development were not forthcoming, and the agency reverted to a routine of aiding refugees to meet their survival needs. 3 7 Education, a traditional generator of national identity, became a primary and sometimes controversial focus of UNRWA programming. 3 8 The sensitivities were reflected by the fact that the contents of textbooks describing the origins and incidents of the conflict which underlay UNRWA's work had to be carefully negotiated. 3 9 The conflict waxed and waned over the decades, repeatedly interrupting the humanitarian and social agenda of UNRWA, including in 1956 in Gaza and 1958 in Lebanon. 4° In 1967, war uprooted some refugees once again, and resulted in further Palestinian politicization and militancy. 4 ' Shelters became tent cities once more, and the UNRWA's work was re-oriented to emergency relief over the next two decades.
2
The Palestinian intifada fundamentally affected the agency. As this conflict of national aspirations evolved in the midst of the Israeli occupation, UNRWA added programs and staff, and developed an innovative protection mandate. 4 3 The agency utilized publicity and the deployment of special staff (Refugee Affairs Officers and Legal Officers) in an effort to provide some measure of redress for the abuse of refugees.
4 4 UNRWA became an advocate for refugee rights, and a mechanism to report on and publicize Israeli treatment of Palestinians in the occupied 36 territories under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 4 5 "Protection by publicity" became a key agency strategy. 4 6 Once post-196 7 emergency donations began diminishing, the agency fell into financial crisis, which persisted until 1983 when budget reforms were introduced. 4 7 Improved stability and modernized planning and budgetary techniques once again encouraged donors to contribute funds.
4 " The notoriety associated with the intifada stimulated contributions, but as the emergency became routine, budgetary shortfalls returned. 4 9 The relations of the agency with the parties to the conflict were often strained, including the Palestinian Liberation Organization. 5° Politically, UNRWA balances between collaboration with the occupying authority, and cooptation by the refugees and their political organizations. 5 ' The agency's local employees, many of whom are refugees, have sought to pressure UNRWA to take stands on behalf of refugee causes.
5 2 The agency has often had difficulties with host governments, as well as the Israeli army, over its prerogatives as an international or- UNRWA is institutionally synonymous with the conflict. 58 These circumstances will inevitably shape UNRWA's role after a resolution of the conflict.
IV. REFUGEE SOLUTIONS: NEW AND OLD HOMES-RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, AND THIRD-COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT
Resolution of the Palestinian refugee question will necessarily involve some combination of three possible place-based outcomes: 1) some measure of voluntary return, 2) a good deal of integration in current places of asylum, and 3) perhaps a significant degree of resettlement in third countries abroad. Indeed, [I] t is difficult to escape the painful conclusion that UNRWA, directly or indirectly, is complicit in terrorism.").
nada may accept as many as 15,000 Palestinian refugees living in other Arab States. 5 9 While this report is disputed, the notion of such an offer has resonated in speculations about a settlement. 6°O f course, the precise dimension of each of these place-based outcomes, and their inter-relationships, will be grist for the negotiators' mill.
The generic international regime relating to refugees provides a starting point for considering a realistic framework for practical solutions to the Palestinian refugee question. The generic refugee regime is treaty-based and concerns itself with the legal status of individuals who fear persecution upon return to their home country.
6 1 Various civil and economic rights are to be respected by the country of asylum in the protection of refugees. 6 2 In practice, this often means the provision of basic humanitarian assistance, and a firm rule, sometimes violated, not to force refugees back to a place of persecution. 6 3
The centerpiece of the generic regime is the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, as amplified by its 1967 Protocol to deal with refugees around the world. 64 Today, 145 States have signed one of these two U.N. refugee treaties and have undertaken to provide protection and assistance for individuals who left their home countries, and who meet the treaty definition of the term "refugee. ' 6 5 That is, a person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. ' 6 6 This contrasts with the operational construct for Palestinian refugees-residence at the specified place and time, coupled with loss of home and livelihood, than the return home of an exile? Indeed, discussion of this outcome has been featured through the Palestinian-Israeli conflict." The reality, of course, is often quite different. Circumstances may have changed, and the community may no longer exist. Indeed, there may be nothing to which to return. New homes may beckon, or indeed, may have already been found.
A. Repatriation
The largest recent repatriation program concerns Afghans returning to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan. 7 " Some two million Afghans have repatriated since the U.S.-led military campaign ended in 2002.
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" UNHCR has requested U.S.$195 million to assist return to Afghanistan for 2003, including transportation and a rather meager reintegration package for individuals comprising between U.S.$5 to U.S.$30 to cover transportation costs, as well as plastic sheeting, flour, and hygiene materials. 8°O ther significant repatriation efforts over the recent past have included Cambodia where, between March 1992 and April 1993, UNHCR repatriated an estimated 370,000 refugees at the cost of over U.S.$128 million.
8 1 In Mozambique some 1.7 million refugees (from six neighboring countries) returned home from 1992 to 1996, costing around U.S.$150 million. 8 In the 1980's, more than two million people fled their homes from civil conflict in Central America. 84 During the early 1990s most of the 72,000 Nicaraguan refugees were repatriated, along with 350,000 internally displaced people, and 30,000 former combatants. 8 5 By the mid-1990s, an estimated 32,000 Salvadoran refugees had been repatriated. 8 6 And by the late 1990s, 42,000 Guatemalan refugees were repatriated from Mexico, with an additional 22,000 choosing to settle permanently in Mexico. 8 v Refugee repatriation schemes normally involve UNHCR, which seeks to ensure the voluntariness of return and to provide transportation and some measure of reintegration assistance. 8 8 International non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") often are the logistical implementers of return programs. 8 9
The repatriation operations in Cambodia, Central America and Mozambique reflected a somewhat broader approach to repatriation. Unlike the small-scale and short-term operations that UNHCR had previously engaged in, these new operations sought to include a longer-term approach which aimed at reconstruction, peace building, and reintegration. 9 " The results of this holistic approach have been difficult to measure. 9 '
Unlike generic repatriations, questions of voluntariness may not feature very prominently in the return of Palestinian refugees, since this is, indeed, the declared aim of Palestinian advocates. 2 There will be logistical needs, but depending on the di- mension of repatriation, they may be relatively modest." 3 If return is limited to family unity cases, then there will be a need for the assessment of family ties, at least once agreement is reached on the definition of the family concept as it relates to extended members. 9 4 UNHCR has had some experience with family-related adjudications for Indochinese and Haitians. 9 5 But it is not a mainstream activity of the agency, and a variety of NGOs could be called upon to undertake this work as well. 9 6
B. Resettlement
A large-scale Palestinian refugee third-country resettlement program, on the other hand, would require a new international framework. Currently, eight countries -Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United States -accept most of the 100,000 or so refugees who are resettled world-wide each year, with Australia, Canada, and the United States in the lead. 9 7 Increasingly, UNHCR operates as a referral mechanism for cases of third-country resettlement, which the agency considers a remedy of "last resort" to address individuals with specific needs for protection. 9 " The International Organization for Migration ("IOM"), governed by a council of ninety-eight Member States and thirty-three observer States, typically provides practical and logistical support for the movement of resettling refugees. 9 National resettlement groups ordinarily provide integration assistance.' 0 0
While each country uses the generic refugee definition to determine eligibility, this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for admission, and each country applies somewhat distinctive additional criteria for resettlement. Nordic countries, for ex- In 1946, the International Refugee Organization ("IRO") was established to coordinate resettlement. 10 4 The IRO, which existed from December 1946 to January 1952, was founded to focus on the needs for new permanent homes for a residual population of individuals who had fled (refugees) and been dislocated (displaced persons) by reason of World War 11. 105 Initially, this uprooted population was ministered to by a predecessor U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ("UNRRA"), which focused on both societal recovery as well as humanitarian relief in the context of devastated post-war Europe in the 1940s.' 1 6 Unlike UNRRA, the IRO focused specifically on the refugee question, giving it a coherent organizational mission.' 0 7
The IRO was the first major U.N. humanitarian opera- tion. °8 During its existence, the agency resettled 1,038,750 refugees to 65 different countries, including nearly 300,000 persons to the United States. IRO's annual budget was in excess of U.S.$150 million with an administrative budget of nearly U.S.$5 million. At the height of its operations, the agency had 5,600 staff, and arrangements with 120 humanitarian groups, in which it invested nearly U.S.$40 million to provide ancillary social services to refugees and displaced persons. Overall, the IRO expended over U.S.$400 million. 1°9 The IRO was established as the first U.N. "specialized agency," although its founders gave relatively little attention to what this form of organization actually meant. 1 ' In practice, the agency was granted considerable operational independence, as its programs were not subject to supervision by the General Assembly."' 1 The predominant mission of the IRO was resettlement in Western Europe and beyond.' 1 2 In the early years of the agency's operations, there was a small measure of refugee repatriation, with the IRO organizing the return of 72,834 refugees to their home country. ' But increasingly unwilling to repatriate, the residue of this displaced population became an object of international attention as the ideological confrontation of the Cold War worsened.' 1 4 Return to Communist-dominated homelands became unpalatable to western governments, most notably the United States." 5 The IRO, which was funded and thus governed by western governments, faced early denunciations by the Soviet bloc as being dedicated primarily to promoting labor mi- In this connection, it is interesting to note the difficulty the IRO faced in attempting to resettle refugees with high educational and professional attainments."
7 Manual laborers were preferred in the labor-starved work places of post-war Europe." 8 Another illustrative mass resettlement scheme was prompted three decades later by a humanitarian crisis in Southeast Asia. As countries in the region refused to allow asylum seekers to land, thousands of Vietnamese perished in the South China Sea. " 9 A terrifying specter emerged, of small, ramshackle boats containing thousands of desperate refugees roaming the seas of Southeast Asia, before they either drowned or starved. To begin the effort, in July 1979, the U.N. convened an international conference of sixty-five governments, along with international organizations and NGO's. 122 The Secretary-General opened the conference by emphasizing the need for all countries to realize the obligations and responsibilities of the countries of origin, asylum and final settlement.
123 "The countries of origin had an obligation to respect the right of emigration and family reunification, while avoiding any action," leading to the departure of their nationals under dangerous conditions. They also had a responsibility to cooperate with UNHCR "to ensure an orderly outflow. 1 25 Since the countries of asylum were themselves developing countries with their own social and economic problems, it was considered essential that countries outside the area be primarily responsible for eventual resettlement.
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Pledges were made at the conference by developed countries to expand greatly the number of refugees they would be willing to resettle.1 27 Funding was also pledged to finance the refugee support and relief operations.1 28 In order to reduce the size of the build-up of asylum seekers, Vietnam agreed to enforce a moratorium on illegal departures from its shores. 12 An initial decline in the number of boat people was not, however, permanent. In January 1986, Vietnam suspended its program of orderly departures to the United States, the country that had accepted most of those legally departing. 3° This development, coupled with increased arrivals and diminished thirdcountry resettlement, presented another looming refugee crisis.' 3 ' Representatives of seventy-six governments met in Geneva in June 1989 at a second international conference on Indochinese refugees to establish procedures to screen on a region-wide basis those asylum seekers who arrived after a cut-off date in order to determine which among them deserved resettlement as refugees. 3 2 Those rejected were subject to return, including mandatory deportation, to Vietnam in order to discourage clandestine departures and establish legal emigration as the eventual sole method of departure."'
This new Comprehensive Plan of Action ("CPA") was adopted at the conference under which countries in the region agreed to continue to provide first asylum in return for a promise of resettlement abroad of both the "long stayer" population as well as more recent arrivals determined to be "refugees," as defined under U.N. criteria. 134 Status adjudication procedures were developed on a region-wide basis.
1 35 Decisions were made to be taken by the national authorities in accordance with the generic criteria.' 3 6 UNHCR was to be a trainer and technical advisor to governments, as well as a monitor of the proceedings, and source of counseling resource for applicants.
1 37 A Steering Committee of governments was established to implement the
CPA.138
What are the implications of these mass resettlement experiences for a Palestinian refugee resettlement program? The IRO and CPA experiences suggest Palestinian resettlement could be effectuated by UNHCR and IOM, although UNHCR's refugee mandate is qualitatively different, and founded on the generic refugee concept of a person in flight from persecution. Agency culture certainly could complicate matters. Many UNHCR staff became disenchanted with the concept of resettlement particularly after involvement with resettling refugees from South East Asia.
14° "There was not a detailed discussion of who was and was not a refugee," explained a UNHCR resettlement official, "the refugee camps were a problem that demanded a resolution." But many in the agency resented being pressured to resettle these refugees by the United States, UNHCR's largest single donor government.
1 4 ' Agency staff saw themselves as unwilling participants in the creation of an "automatic resettlement 147 Refugees are adjudicated as eligible and appropriate for admission before investigations are requested. 148 In the case of Palestinian refugees, given the group nature of the determination, those desiring to avail themselves of resettlement abroad should be allowed to request a security check up front. 4 ' Such a procedure would permit applicants to learn early on whether they may have an entry problem. For those who do not, the process could be expedited. A speedy and reliable third-country resettlement solution would help build confidence on all sides.
A more serious impediment to a significant resettlement effort concerns the difference between the Palestinian definition of refugee and the generic concepts. 5° refugee laws of the main resettlement countries generally incorporate the U.N. refugee standard.
15 1 If Palestinian refugees are to be resettled in significant numbers, then adjustments would likely have to be made in numerous national legal systems. Potential resettling governments will thus have to review their laws and make any necessary amendments in order to establish new or expanded humanitarian admissions authorities that would cover Palestinians.
C. Local Integration
A local integration strategy will undoubtedly be the predominant solution for Palestinian refugees. This approach will require a comprehensive assistance and development strategy to address the well-being of Palestinian refugees as well as the host communities into which they would more fully assimilate. 1 " 2 This would involve political, legal, social and economic initiatives designed to root refugees in their new communities. UNRWA could, of course, play an important role in this endeavor. Indeed, this is what UNRWA has done for much of its existence-provide assistance verging on development. 153 The U.N. Development Group and World Bank would also play major roles in developing country and regional integration strategies as they did in Cambodia, Central America, and Mozambique, and in relation to past refugee repatriations. Integration assistance, of course, can facilitate resettlement, local integration, or repatriation. Such assistance can cover matters such as language instruction, micro-credit lending, reviving agricultural production, and according citizenship. Development aid relating to Palestinian refugees, of course, has always been a sensitive question.' 55 Refugee advocates have resisted assistance such as housing aid, which might be construed as choos- ing integration and forfeiting the return option. 1 56 Extending benefits to the host community is a conventional wisdom relating to promoting repatriation and local integration. It is also an accepted method of dealing with Palestinian refugees camps, which is necessitated by practical and logistical reasons, albeit without addressing the formal juridical status of the camps.
157
Generic refugee repatriation efforts over the past few decades have sought to integrate repatriation and development assistance, with mixed success. 158 Indeed, the difficulty of transitioning from humanitarian to development assistance modalities remains one of the principal challenges of humanitarian action in our era.
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Integration assistance, moreover, can involve substantial sums. The annual budget of the European Commission's Humanitarian Office ("ECHO") has been running at about C500 million over the past several years, 6 ' with about one-third each going to refugee reception and integration activities, and about half that amount used to facilitate voluntary repatriation around the world. 16 t In the region, Israel has been a leading practitioner of integration assistance.' 6 2 Since 1989, over 1.1 million persons have emigrated to Israel,' 6 3 and, in recent years, the Compensation for property loss is only one aspect of the possibility for financial resource transfers that may be included in a political settlement. Recent discussions about a settlement have identified additional payment modalities relating to the situation of Palestinians who departed from their homes, in effect, a notion of being "compensated" for the condition of interna- For those desiring to return to long-lost lands and houses, confirmation of title may be crucial, particularly if currently occupied by others. For this purpose, a restitution mechanism could be used to award possession to returning refugees, like the Bosnian Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees ("CRPC") established under Annex 7 of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. 71 The Bosnian Property Commission is a mixed body of international and national commissioners, with three international members appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, and six national members, of which four are appointed by the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and two by the Republika Srpska.1 72 The commissioners have been supported by some 400 local staff, and twelve regional field offices. 176. See Das, supra note 174.
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Housing and Property Directorate to mediate disputed claims, and the U.N. in 1999 in Kosovo to adjudicate rights disputes arising during Kosovo's post-autonomy period (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) ."' The Kosovo mechanisms seek to regularize informal property trades and restore rights to those whose homes have been illegally occupied. 7 8 Officials expect to process an estimated 100,000 residential claims. 1 79 In Kosovo, as of July 2003, 28,587 claims have been filed, and by the end of 2003, about 13,000 cases had been decided. 80 If mediation fails, then a claim is decided by a three-member panel of commissioners, one local and two international, and may be reviewed in limited circumstances by a second panel.' 8 ' The commission decisions are final, and unlike the Bosnian Commission, may not be reviewed by any other judicial authority, including local courts.1 8 2
Refugee return became a political imperative in the efforts of the United States and Western European powers to end the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo that were spawned after the disintegration over the past decade of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 8 The bundle of human rights violations designed to displace people, commonly known as "ethnic cleansing," were reflected in property law arrangements which the Bosnian and Kosovo mechanisms were designed to unravel. 184 But while considerable progress has been made at the formal level, both the Bosnian and Kosovo efforts have confronted difficulties in implementation by resistant local authorities, reflecting the tenuous nature of the peace. 18 December 2002, only 681 forced evictions had been executed.
Palestinian refugee advocates have urged, as an acknowledgement of accountability for past injustices, a restitution-based approach to restore property to absent refugees and simultaneously protect the rights of current occupants as tenants.' 86 This is tantamount to ownership with no right to oust the current occupying tenant. But care should be taken not to introduce conflictual elements in an already tense situation. Such inconclusive arrangements could precipitate disputes along the line of those experienced in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Moreover, the objectives of a compensation scheme can be decisive. The Bosnian property commission and the more recent effort in Kosovo are designed to confirm property ownership in order to permit persons to regain possession.
18 7 Local authorities have resisted compliance." 8 8 As a lawyer familiar with claims and restitution mechanisms put it, "It is easier to dish out money than implementing solutions on the ground."
But even monetary compensation for lost Palestinian refugee and Israeli property will present several challenges. Such compensation arrangements will require the establishment of a special institution for the duration of the scheme. While there are unique features in the situation, there are other experiences which may provide useful insights for the development of such mechanisms.
In fact, there is a long history of using international claims tribunals to settle disputes, many dealing with alien property. From the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Britain, until World War II, claims tribunals were often used to effectuate war reparations. 1 8 9 Such tribunals, however, came to be considered too slow and overly expensive, leading increasingly to the use of lump sum agreements. While the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal proved relatively effective in resolving commercial disputes involving U.S. government agencies and private firms, 193 it was less effective in relation to the claims of private U.S. citizens who had left Iran.' 9 4 Awards, mainly to U.S. claimants, were paid out of frozen bank assets. 195 More recently, the U.N. Compensation Commission ("UNCC"), was set up in 1991 by the U.N. Security Council to process claims and pay compensation for direct losses resulting from Iraq's 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait."' The UNCC is governed by a council comprising the fifteen members of the U.N. Security Council, 9 7 which declared Iraq liable under international law for these losses.' 98 In terms of its program, the UNCC has a supporting secretariat of some 200 persons, and uses eighteen three-member panels of commissioners who act as quasijudges in the examination of claims.' 9 9 Under UNCC procedures, individual claims are presented by governments, and payments to claimants are made through governments.
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The UNCC has become the epitome of a mass claims exercise. Since its inception, the UNCC has adjudicated approximately 2.6 million claims, ninety-nine percent of which have been resolved, with nearly U.S.$44 billion in compensation being awarded (U.S.$18 billion of which has actually been paid) . In recent years, the quest to right historical wrongs has led to the proliferation of new claims mechanisms which came about under the pressure of U.S. class action court litigation. Notable among the efforts is the German foundation (Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future) which was established in 2000, and funded by the German State and a consortium of private companies to compensate individuals for Nazi abuses such as slave and forced labor, as well as property lOSS. The German foundation is governed by a board of trustees, staffed by a management group, and operates through a complex system utilizing a group of seven partner organizations that process claims from different categories of eligible claimants and that make payments to those claimants. 21 2 Significantly, the Swiss Banks Settlement mechanism includes an innovative "refugee" class of claimants-persons who attempted to flee Nazi persecution and who were refused entry into Switzerland and were abused thereafter. 2 13 Approximately 6380 claims were made under the refugee class category, and, as of May 2003, the Jewish Claims Conference has recommended that 1180 of the claimants, mostly Holocaust survivors, be awarded a total of U.S.$2 million. The remaining refugee class claimants are mostly heirs and have yet to be reviewed.
These recent mass claims facilities ordinarily have three functional organs: one that sets and oversees policy, another that adjudicates the claims, and a third that supports the process administratively. Rules are ordinarily developed during the process, and the participation of the parties is limited. 214 Evidenments" from the menu on the left, then select the above named document from the list of documents). A compensation scheme for lost Palestinian refugee property would introduce complications relating to the identification of refugee properties and choosing from among a range of methods of valuation. While much documentation has been collected on this question, these controversies have yet to be authoritatively resolved. 2 1 7 In furtherance of a settlement, it would be necessary to map out the universe of refugee property and assign values to the individual properties. In addition, compensation may be limited by the overall level of funds provided for this purpose, introducing yet another series of complexities.
Perhaps the most authoritative statistics assembled to date on the scope and value of Arab property was produced by the technical program of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine ("UNCCP"), which began its work in 1952, and which reported initially in 1964.218 This report was amended in certain respects by the computerization of the underlying data in 2000.219 The UNCCP Property database contains some 453,000 records documenting about 1.5 million individual holdings.
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The project calculated the scope of Arab land at 4,851,613.98 dunums (one dunum equals 1,000 square meters), with a value of 100,383,784 Palestinian pounds 2 2 1 (one Palestinian pound in In organizing a program of work, a compensation facility relating to Palestinian refugees would have to issue procedural rules, including a deadline for submission of claims, and design a claims form that requests all relevant information. Experience with other efforts teaches that close attention should be paid at the outset to the design of such a form in order to ensure both comprehensiveness and understandability. 224 This will be particularly important as many claimants will be unfamiliar with such forms. As has been used with the German foundation and Bosnian property commission, a helpline and proactive efforts to facilitate the filing of claims will be needed.
In a Palestinian refugee claims mechanism, UNRWA would be an obvious resource in terms of notifying potential refugee claimants of the procedures and deadline for the filing of claims; however, it cannot be the exclusive mechanism, because many refugees have no contact with the agency. A special outreach effort would be needed, particularly for claimants outside of the region of UNRWA's mandate.
Compensating refugee property claims would be more complicated and take longer than paying out departure claims, probably requiring a decade or so to complete the task given the experience of other property claims efforts. But relatively quick closure on this contentious issue could help to build confidence between the parties and avert renewed tensions.
A variety of measures could be used to expedite payments. Individual property values can be assessed using standardized methodologies. Claims that present common features can be grouped and sampling techniques can be used to check the accuracy of groupings. As was done in the case of the German Foundation, a relaxed evidentiary standard demanding that claims be supported by only plausible proof could be used to take into account the loss of documentation and memory that typically accompanies the passage of time. 22 5 Determining the adequacy of compensation will be a key issue. Methods and techniques exist to determine the value of refugee property, either by individual valuation or through estimates. 2 2 6 An overarching issue will be whether the funds available are sufficient to satisfy the claims, and if not, whether the financial resources available are sufficient to provide adequate compensation.
For example, funding limitations might require that only a pro rata portion of property claims be paid, but it would be necessary even in this event to identify the claims and assign them values for purposes of equity. Whether based on departure or property loss, threshold estimates are likely to be inexact to some extent. 2 27 One method of dealing with the resulting uncertainty is to pay fixed claims in installments, say the first sixty percent of the claim, until all claims are paid and an upward bound resource obligation is calculated. This could be followed by payment of the last installment of forty percent, or a lesser remainder. Such a procedure has been used for German foundation claims. 2 28 Information and evidence contained in claims forms must be verified by using sources such as the UNCCP database or UNRWA records. As UNRWA evolved over five decades, it registered a growing and shifting refugee population and collected millions of records. Details about current UNRWA recipients of relief and social services, some 225,000 individuals, are contained in a computer database. 232 Records relating to another 800,000 families exist, but are not computerized. 23 A U.S.$6 million proposal by UNRWA to scan the family files into a database, if funded, might take upwards of three years or more to implement, according to UNRWA staff. 234 The special institution to arrange compensation for Palestinian refugees will require a policy body comprising the principal stakeholders, commissioners to decide claims, and a supporting secretariat. Disputes over property claims could be resolved by an independent appeals board, as provided for in the German foundation claims procedure. A specific waiver of judicial remedies could avoid complicated institutional disputes which have vexed the Bosnian Property Commission. A different set of technical issues would be raised in the organization of a refugee fund. In particular, once a fund is established to defray the social costs associated with refugee return, integration and resettlement, it could be replenished through periodic financial contributions by donor governments for these purposes. Funds would be dispersed, as is normally the case, upon the preparation of needs assessments relating to the refugees and their communities and specific project proposals.
6
Implementation could be evaluated for effectiveness.
Another approach still would likely be needed in order to organize payments for the departure of individuals. In this instance, in order to fix appropriate payment amounts, funds would be committed by governments at the outset. In addition, the number of eligible refugee claimants would have to be iden-tified in order to calculate the level of compensation. This would raise contentious questions concerning who is a refugee, and how many refugees would be eligible to claim, including descendants of those who originally left Palestine.
Threshold definitional issues will concern such matters as the notion of refugee descendants, raising issues such as how many generations and what degree of relationship. How will loss of livelihood be evaluated? What about individuals who remained inside Israel? Or those uprooted in 1976 from the West Bank and Gaza who are sometimes referred to as "displaced persons." 2 37 Once numbers have been identified, and once the amount of funds available is fixed, then lump sum payments for individuals and families could be calculated and paid to the individuals.
These claims would be similar in some respects to the departure claims that were paid under category "A" of the UNCC category. "A" claims are those of individuals who had to leave Kuwait or Iraq between the date of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on August 2, 1990, and the date on which the Iraqi occupation came to an end on March 2, 1991. 238 Compensation for successful claimants in this category was fixed at U.S.$2500 for individuals and U.S.$5000 for families (U.S.$4000 and 8000, respectively, if claims were not lodged in other categories). In the case of the UNCC, payments to individuals were made by the governments that presented the claims.
The new generation of compensation mechanisms has proven workable, in part, because of the application of modern information technology and sampling methods. A lawyer who worked with the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal, and who was deeply involved with the operations of the UNCC, emphasized the importance of computerization in organizing claims for processing. This requires an investment of resources up front but is "critical to the success" of any compensation effort.
The failure by governments to provide money at the outset, for example, slowed the work of the Bosnian Property Commission substantially. 23 9 The entire enterprise was "a last minute thought" in peace negotiations, according to an official with the commission.
4 "
Like the restitution mechanism in Kosovo, the Bosnian Commission was starved for funds from the outset and only began to have an impact when it began to produce decisions and build the confidence of claimants. 241 However, the basic formula for a successful claims effort can be discerned from the experience of the past decade. As a lawyer familiar with the German Foundation claims program and UNCC noted, to be effective a claims scheme had to have both a "human face," referring to outreach and facilitates activities, as well as a "cold technical" capacity in the form of sophisticated information technology and computerization. 
VI. IN ANTICIPATION OF SETTLEMENT
A settlement of the Palestinian refugee question would require a number of interrelated program components relating to repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. In addition to these place-based options, there would also need to be mechanisms for compensation arrangements. The components must be melded together in order to fashion a coherent international response.
An assemblage of new and old tasks would be necessary for dealing with the Palestinian refugee question. This might mean the creation of a new time-limited unified entity, like the IRO, in effect a Palestinian Refugee Organization, or a situation-based solutions program, like the Indochinese Comprehensive Plan of Action, in this instance a CPA for Palestinian refugees. While coherence of effort would be promoted by a unified entity, there is an understandable reluctance by donor governments to create new international organizations, particularly to deal with timebound problems. This is often a criticism leveled against UNRWA. UNRWA itself is too bound up with the underlying conflict to be the aegis for these multifaceted activities, and build confidence among parties which are likely to be wary even after a political settlement. 24 4 While UNRWA has many important continuing roles to play, 45 something new would be needed. This includes a discrete compensation mechanism, which could be either a program component of an existing organization, like IOM's property commission, or a free-standing but related organization, like the Bosnian Property Commission.
The I.R.O. experience provides the case for a separate, time-limited new agency in order to focus the mission. And while implementation would likely take many years, as did the work of the I.R.O., a separate dedicated agency could go out of existence at a future time when the problem it was mandated to address has been resolved. 4 6 While compensation activities require different sets of skills and tasks, a degree of comprehensiveness would be achieved by having one institutional rubric that included these activities as well, particularly if compensation were envisioned to help defray the costs of return, integration, and resettlement abroad.
Many issues relating to institutional framework and implementing procedures would have to await a settlement. But negotiations could address some critical matters which would facilitate resolution, such as was done in the property annex to the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord that ended the Bosnian conflict. For example:
1. The terms "Palestinian refugee" and "family" should be defined in the settlement. This could give settlement implementers guidance on issues of what type of property loss is subject to compensation (loss of home and livelihood). It will also give donors and others a sense of the potential numbers of claimants, including descendants, as well as those in need of new homes or old homes; 2. The best evidence of refugee property ownership should be identified, such as the UNCC records. While there may be lingering disputes at the margins that must be resolved, a consensus on this issue will enable claims work to begin so that refugees can see the benefits of a settlement quickly and begin to gain confidence in the process; and 3. If a new unified organization with a designated inter-governmental management structure is not established, then a steering group of interested governments should be created to oversee and provide policy guidance to the array of international organizations and NGOs that would be responsible for implementing a multi-faceted set of initiatives designed to resolve the refugee question. This body could also oversee the revision of national laws that would be necessary to implement a thirdcountry resettlement program. A similar approach was taken in the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese refugees. 2 4 8
Generic refugee solutions have evolved over the past century, and institutional mechanisms have been refined to implement these solutions. 24 9 Similarly, mass compensation claims techniques and frameworks have evolved. 250 While arrangements for Palestinian refugees will be complex, there is ample experience out of which to fashion the institutional framework, procedures, and criteria to implement a plausible settlement. All that remains is for the parties to make peace. 
